In this paper we experimentally study performance of men and women under competition, with implicitly and explicitly induced stereotype threats to both sexes. We use a mathematical task that is perceived as male-dominant and creates an implicit stereotype threat against woman. We also study conditions in which we explicitly reinforce or contradict the implicit stereotype threat by providing appropriate information. We find that despite stereotype threats against women, both men and women react positively and equally strong to competitive incentives. When the stereotype threat is explicitly contradicted, competitive incentives do not have an effect on the performance of both men and women. Our findings contrast previous results suggesting that men are more responsive to competition than women. We observe that men and women react similarly to competition in terms of performance across three different stereotype threat conditions. Interestingly, we also find that explicit stereotypebased expectations that contradict the stereotype men and women hold harm the competitive performance of both sexes.
Introduction
A politically, socially and economically important stylized fact about sex 1 differences is the gap in wages and positions at the workplace. In 2006 women earned, on average, 25% less than men in the 27 European Union countries. In academics, qualified research positions such as PhD candidates, post-doctoral or assistant professors, associate professors and full professors are dominated by men. For instance, only 19% of all full professors in the 27 European Union countries are women. 2 Further evidence for the disadvantaged position of women at the workplace is presented, for example, by Bertrand and Hallock (2001). 3 One common explanation for these differences between the sexes at the workplace is discrimination (e.g., Black and Strahan, 2001 ). Another one is women's higher sensitivity to work-family conflicts and women's weaker negotiation behavior (e.g., Babcock and Laschever, 2003 ). An alternative explanation has been suggested by recent studies in experimental economics: men are more inclined to compete than women. These studies show that even under tightly controlled and relatively abstract situations where men and women compete with each other, a difference in attitude towards competition between the sexes exists. This literature addresses two main questions:
I. Differences in preference for competitive environments, i.e., do men and women selfselect a competitive environment differently?
II. Differences in performance under competition, i.e., do men and women react differently to competitive pressure in terms of performance?
Concerning self-selection of competitive environments a standard finding is that women shy away from competition when given the option to compete whereas men do not (e.g., Datta Gupta et al., 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Booth and Nolen, 2009; Gneezy et al., 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2010; Cason et al., 2010) . Regarding behavior under competitive pressure the sparse experimental economics literature shows that men generally increase their work performance under competition whereas this is not (or much less) the case for women. 1 We use the term sex instead of gender because it is more scientifically correct even if it is less politically so. Sex is a biological attribute, defined by chromosomes and anatomic characteristics. It is a binary, either/or trait. Gender, by contrast, is a social construct, the sum of all the attributes typically associated with one sex. It is not fixed and binary but a wide range between masculinity and femininity (see Eliot, 2009 Gneezy et al. (2003) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) find that men and women who show a similar performance of a task under a non-competitive incentive scheme differ in performance for the same task when they have to compete with each other in mixed sex groups.
The objective of this paper is to investigate experimentally the extent to which stereotypes are related to men's and women's behavior under competitive pressure when they have to compete with each other. The only study we are aware of that experimentally establishes a possible connection between stereotypes and economic competition between sexes is from Günther et al. (2010) . The authors argue that the experimental economics literature on how the sex influences the attitude towards competition is possibly flawed because these studies contain tasks for which stereotype assumptions about male superiority are relevant for the performance. They hypothesize that in mixed sex groups women compete less in tasks that are perceived as typically male because women are stereotypically expected to perform worse than men. Such an effect should not be observed in sex-neutral tasks and perceived female tasks.
Besides replicating the main finding in the literature that women react less to competitive incentives for a male task, Günther et al. (2010) indeed find that women react as strongly as men and more strongly than men in response to competitive pressure for a sex neutral task and a female task, respectively.
This under-explored explanation for men's and women's attitudes towards competition is motivated by the psychology literature on stereotype threat. Stereotype threat is essentially a situational phenomenon in which a member of a group feels pressured by the possibility of confirming a negative stereotype about his/her group (e.g., Steele and Aronson, 1995) . This literature reports that stereotype threat undermines task performance of various groups across multiple domains. This effect is shown, for example, amongst African-Americans (e.g., Steele and Aronson, 1995) and Latinos (e.g., Aronson et al., 1998 ) when compared to Caucasians on tests labelled as indicators of intellectual ability, amongst women when compared to men during tests evaluating mathematical ability (e.g., Spencer et al., 1999) , and amongst Caucasian men in math-tests when informed about Asian-Americans' superior ability in mathematics (Aronson et al., 1999) . Fundamentally, this literature predicts that the performance gap between members of a group prone to stereotype threat and members of a group not prone to stereotype threat should be different depending on whether a threat exists or not. One should highlight, though, that the focus of the stereotype threat literature is on performance evaluation within non-competitive environments. 4 For a review of the stereotype thereat literature see Kit, Tuokko and Mateer (2008) .
A stereotype threat experience could be triggered in the presence of either an implicit or explicit stereotype. Implicit activation of stereotype threat refers to cases in which simply being placed in a situation within a domain where the negative stereotype is well known, although not explicitly highlighted, is sufficient to trigger the threat. Explicit activation of stereotype threat refers to cases in which the threat is activated by confronting an individual directly with the negative stereotype (e.g., Smith and White, 2002) . The main argument in Günther et al. (2010) is that the way a task is described suffices to activate a stereotype threat. Therefore, in these authors' work the implicit activation of a stereotype threat is the key element that seems to explain differences in performance under competition between men and women.
In real life examples of competition between the sexes such as, for example, women competing for academic positions in math-intensive areas or aiming top paid corporate positions, women are explicitly made aware that these positions are dominated by men and that people expect men to be more successful than women in those domains. Although evaluating the effect of implicit stereotype-based expectations gives an important first insight, we consider a more pertinent approach to also study competition between men and women in contexts where we explicitly induce stereotype-based expectations.
In this paper we use a controlled laboratory experiment to examine men's and women's performance of a mathematical task when they have to compete with each other not only in the presence of an implicit stereotype threat, but also in the presence of an explicit stereotype threat. Moreover, in the explicit case we evaluate not only the effect of a negative stereotype about women but also the effect of a negative stereotype about men. These explicit stereotypebased expectations are induced by providing appropriate information. We hypothesize that men's and women's competitive performance is harmed only if the stereotype-based expectations they face contradict the stereotype men and women hold. Distracting thoughts have been shown to interfere with working memory and attention (e.g., Brewin and Smart, 2005) , which are essential to the performance of a mathematical task. Hence, if men's and women's prior belief about the invoke stereotype is contradicted, one should expect distracting thoughts to emerge and interfere with working memory and attention. Accordingly, we hypothesize that men's and women's competitive performance is not harmed within an implicit stereotype context because the stereotype-based expectations men and women could perceive in this case are necessarily triggered by their prior belief. In the explicit context, where we provide information to explicitly induce stereotype-based expectations, we hypothesize that men's and women's performance under competition is harmed only if the stereotype-based expectations embedded in the information we provide contradict the stereotype they hold.
To test our hypotheses, we examine competition between the sexes using three conditions.
We induce an implicit stereotype against women, an explicit stereotype against women and an explicit stereotype against men in the first, second and third conditions, respectively. The results validate our hypothesis: in the implicit case, women react positively and as strongly as men to the competitive incentives. In the explicit stereotype against women case, in which we explicitly induce stereotype-based expectations that support the stereotype that men and women hold, both men and women react positively and equally strong to the competitive incentives. Finally, in the explicit stereotype against men case, in which we explicitly induce stereotype-based expectations that contradict the stereotype that men and women hold, both men and women do not react significantly to the competitive incentives.
Our study shows a clear connection between explicit stereotypes and men's and women's performance under competition but not in accordance with an explanation based on stereotype threat. The main insight of this paper is that men's and women's response to competitive pressure in terms of performance is similar across three different competitive contexts and it is negatively affected only in the case where the explicit stereotype-based expectations contradict the stereotype men and women hold.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the experiment and section 3 presents the results. Conclusions are discussed in section 4.
Experimental Design

A. Methods
In the first stage, subjects perform the work task under a non-competitive incentive scheme.
In the second stage, the same subjects perform the work task under a competitive incentive scheme. Our main measure is the difference in performance of men and women between the two stages, given they are competing against the opposite sex in the second stage. To our best knowledge the only two studies that experimentally endogenize in the laboratory men's and women's performance under an exogenously given competitive incentive scheme use a between-subjects design in which the performance in a non-competitive environment serves as the baseline (Gneezy et al., 2003; Günther et al., 2010) . We consider, however, that a betweensubjects design could be problematic to analyse performance if the noise in unobserved subject's characteristics is large (chiefly, a subject's ability to perform the task). Hence, we use a within-subjects design instead which allows us to interpret the data without concern for ability differences across subjects.
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B. The work task
The task we use requires mathematical ability. It consists of multiplying one-and two-digit numbers and was already successfully used in Dohmen and Falk (2010) . In the experiment all problems are presented to subjects on computer screens. Subjects have to type their answer into a box and confirm it by clicking an "OK"-button with their mouse. Having confirmed their answer, subjects are informed whether or not the answer is correct. If it is correct, a new problem appears instantaneously on the screen. If the answer is wrong, subjects have to tackle the same problem again until the correct solution is entered. Subjects are forced to solve a problem before a new question appears in order to prevent subjects from guessing and searching for "easy" problems. The difficulty level of multiplying one-and two-digit numbers varies quite a bit which implies that different problems require different usages of working memory. As Dohmen and Falk (2010) we implement five different levels of difficulty. 6 All subjects go through the exact same sequence of problems and they are provided with as many questions as they can solve within the allocated time. Subjects are informed that no aid is allowed for answering the problems (calculator, paper and pencil, etc.), which is controlled during the experiment.
An important reason for having chosen this task is that the implicit stereotype present in the task description is unambiguous: the stereotype that "men are better at maths" (see, e.g., Spence et al., 1999) . Moreover, for math tasks there is reliable information that we can use in order to make our desired explicit stereotype manipulations without the need of deceiving subjects.
C. Detailed design and conditions of the experiment
The experiment consists of a practice round, two performance stages, a confidence level elicitation, a risk attitude elicitation and a competitive attitude elicitation. Figure 1 shows the sequential order of each step: At the beginning of the experiment subjects are informed that the experiment consists of three performance rounds and that they will receive specific instructions for each round before the start of each round. They also are informed that they could earn money during the experiment and that their earnings in one round are independent of their own and others behavior in other rounds. There is no performance feedback during or at the end of each performance round neither in absolute terms nor relative to others.
Practice Round: After the general instructions, the experiment starts with an unpaid practice round in which subjects are asked to calculate as many multiplication problems as possible within 2 minutes. This step serves to familiarize subjects with the work task. Subjects are informed that it is in their best interest to gain practice since later in the experiment they can earn money while performing the same task.
First Stage Performance:
This round elicits subjects' baseline performance under noncompetitive monetary incentives. It is this performance level to which we compare the performance in the competitive second stage. Before subjects start with the task they are informed that they have been randomly paired with another participant in the room, without making any reference to the sexes at this stage. Subjects are asked to perform the work task for 5 minutes under a random pay incentive scheme. That is, in each pair one subject is chosen at random to be paid out. The instructions they read explain how this incentive scheme works: "In this round you have been randomly paired with another participant. At the end of the experiment one of you two will be chosen randomly with equal probability. The chosen one will earn € 0.40 for each multiplication solved correctly. The other earns nothing."
Confidence Level Elicitation: To measure subjects' confidence level, we ask them to estimate their relative performance in the non-competitive first stage. Immediately after finishing this stage, each subject is informed that he/she and 4 other participants present in the lab have been randomly chosen with equal probability and is asked to indicate their best estimates, in percentage, that exactly 0, exactly 1, exactly 2, exactly 3 or exactly 4 of these other participants solved more problems correctly than they did themselves in the previous 5 minutes stage. This
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Attitude Elicitation belief elicitation is incentivized using the quadratic scoring rule (Offerman, 1997) and is made before subjects learn about the competitive second stage. The payment procedure we use minimizes the risk difference between the non-competitive and the competitive environments. The competitive incentive scheme that subjects face in the second stage differs from a standard piece-rate incentive-scheme in two ways: being paid depends on the performance of others and it becomes uncertain because only one, the better performer, is paid. Therefore, different attitudes toward risk between men and women can influence performance and obscure the pure competition effect. Hence, in order to minimize effects coming from differences in perceived risk in the two stages, we use an incentive scheme in the non-competitive stage -the random pay -that makes payment uncertain, although not dependent on the performance of others. Our goal is to elicit subject's beliefs about their relative rank compared to the other subjects present in the lab. We ask subjects to rank themselves compared to 4 other randomly chosen participants present in the lab instead of the total number of subjects present in the lab (24 subjects, on average) because the latter way would had been too demanding and, probably, confusing for the subjects. 8 We form pairs instead of larger groups because we consider pairs the simplest way to unambiguously control for subjects' belief of their opponent sex.
9 Still, of course, subjects' risk perception could be different in the non-competitive and the competitive stages. This, however, will be due to the way subjects perceive the competition.
The only difference between the three competitive conditions is the way a stereotype is induced. 
If you wish, you can inspect this paper after the experiment."
As can be seen from the quotes above the text pieces in Condition 2 and Condition 3 are not perfectly symmetric. Perfectly symmetric information could have been achieved only by
deceiving subjects, what we wanted to avoid. Therefore we use truthful information that subjects could inspect at the end of the experiment and construct the text such that it minimizes asymmetry without the need of deceiving subjects.
We did not expect any significant learning or fatigue effects for the chosen work task during the experiment (Dohmen and Falk, 2010) . In order to test this we conduct a control condition.
Condition 4: Twice random pay. In this condition subjects perform again the multiplication task for 5 minutes under the same random pay incentive scheme as in the first stage. They are again randomly paired and not informed about the sex of their partner.
Risk Attitude Elicitation:
We elicit subject's risk attitude using two measures. We elicit subjects' response in a 0-10 scale to the Dohmen et al. (2009) general risk question in which the value 0 means 'not at all willing to take risks' and the value 10 means 'very willing to take risks'. 10 We also elicit subjects' lottery choices based on the method developed by Holt and Laury (2002).
Competitive Attitude Elicitation:
As an indicator of subjects' competitive attitude we use the Machiavelli personality test, also known as Mach IV test (see appendix A), in which high scores reliably predict competitive behavior (Christie and Geis, 1970) . The Mach-IV test is a twenty-statement personality survey with a score range of 20-140.
D. Experimental procedure
The experiment was computerized using z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEElab) at Maastricht University's School of Business and Economics. All instructions were presented on-screen and all interactions were treated confidentially. Eight sessions were run, two sessions with each of the four conditions. In total 188 subjects participated. The experiment involved 20, 22, 24, and 28 mixed sex pairs who participated in the implicit stereotype against women condition, explicit stereotype against women condition, explicit stereotype against men condition and 10 In a paid field experiment Dohmen et al. (2009) show that responses to the question "How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: 'not at all willing to take risks' and the value 10 means: 'very willing to take risks'" reliably predict lottery choices.
twice random pay condition, respectively. 11 The participants were predominantly (86%) students of Business and Economics at Maastricht University. A session lasted on average 70 minutes. Average earnings were € 16.30.
Results
In this section we present the experimental results. In section A we examine how stereotypes are related to men's and women's competitive performance by comparing noncompetitive and competitive performances. In section B we investigate alternative variables that could explain our results. In section C we use the data to test the stereotype threat hypothesis. Finally, in section D we evaluate alternative explanations for the results by examining subjects' effort provision and accuracy during task performance.
A. Non-competitive performance versus competitive performance
The pooled data from all four conditions show that in the non-competitive first stage men perform significantly better than women (men's average number of problems solved correctly:
28.7, standard deviation 10.51; women's average number of problems solved correctly: 23.1, std. dev. 10.20; p < 0.001; 2-sided t-test, n = 188). 12 That men perform better in the first stage can also be seen from Figure 2 , which shows that the distribution of men's performance statistically dominates the corresponding distribution for women. This figure also shows that there is a large inter-individual heterogeneity in performance. To account for this heterogeneity in baseline performance we analyse the within-subject change of performance from the noncompetitive to the competitive stage. For each condition, we perform two types of analysis.
First, we compare men's and women's performance from the non-competitive stage to their performance in the competitive stage. Second, to evaluate differences in this response to competition between men and women, we perform a difference in differences analysis, i.e., we compare men's change in performance to women's change in performance between stages.
This tests if and how men and women, respectively, respond to competitive incentives given they are competing against the opposite sex. Figure 4 corroborates the finding that for both sexes there is neither a fatigue nor an experience effect.
Hence, we are confident that men's and women's performance is not affected by repetition in the other conditions.
In the implicit stereotype against women condition the average number of problems solved correctly by men is 23.9 (std. dev. 11.54) in the non-competitive first stage and 28 (std. dev. performance. Interestingly, as the graphical analysis also indicates, in this condition men's increase in performance is mainly driven by "middle" and "top" performers while women's increase in performance is mainly driven by "bottom" and "top" performers. As in the implicit condition, comparing the change in men's performance to the change in women's performance between the two stages, we find that they are statistically indistinguishable (p = 0.446, t-test; p= 0.509, MW test). We therefore can state our next result. to the other two conditions, women's change in performance is small across "low", "middle"
and "high" performers and men's competitive performance shows not only a small decrease for the "bottom" and "middle" performers but also a clear decrease for the "top" performers. We summarized these observations in the following result.
Result 3: When there is an explicit stereotype against men neither men nor women respond significantly to the introduction of competitive incentives relative to non-competitive incentives. However, when comparing the responses to competitive incentives between men
and women the former weakly decrease performance whereas the latter weakly increase performance.
In order to further examine the treatment effects on men's and women's competitive performance, we also perform a regression analysis. We apply the following linear regression model that treats men and women equally because this is the model that better fits our data according to the Chow test for structural stability between two groups: 13, 14 where Performance change is the difference between the competitive second stage performance and the non-competitive first stage performance; Implicit represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the individuals in the implicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; ExplicitW represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the individuals in 13 We use the Chow test for structural stability to check whether there is any difference between men and women both in terms of intercept and slope. According to this test we cannot reject that men and women behave equally (p-value = 0.227). where women in the twice random pay condition is the base group for the dummies. Table 2 reports the regression result and Table 3 reports the three F-tests related to the regression in which we compare men and women in terms of the magnitude of their competitive response. Table 3 shows that the change in performance between stages of men is not significantly different than women's both in the implicit and explicit stereotype against women conditions.
For the explicit stereotype against men condition we find again marginal evidence that men's competitive response is more negatively affected than women's. Relative to women's change in performance between stages, men's solve 3.696 problems less from the first to the second stage, holding non-competitive performance fixed.
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B. Confidence level, risk attitude and competitive attitude
In our analysis so far we have been stressing the influence of stereotypes over men's and women's competitive performance. In this section we introduce controls that could influence our results.
In the second stage performance the incentive-scheme a subject faces depends not only on a subject's own performance but also on another subject's performance. Therefore, a subject's belief about his/her relative rank may affect a subject's competitive performance. Table 4 presents the results on men's and women's self-assessed rank estimates for their noncompetitive performance. Men's average estimate of 19.62% that they are the best performer in the randomly formed group of 5 participants is significantly higher than the corresponding women's average estimate of 7.5%. Moreover, men's average estimate of 7.65% that they are the worst performer in the randomly formed group of 5 participants is significantly lower than the corresponding women's average estimate of 21.74%. The difference in the remaining estimates is insignificant. These results already indicate that men are more optimistic about 17 Although the regression reported in Table 2 is not the most appropriate to examine the other comparisons we draw in Table 1 (see footnote 13 ), all the results we find in Table 1 also hold qualitatively in Table 2 
, where i is the outcome that exactly (i-1) other participants solved correctly more problems and p i is a subject's percentage estimate that outcome i is the actual one. Hence, the lower is this index the more confident a subject is. 19 We also examine if men are more confident only because they have a significantly better non-competitive performance. In unreported regressions, we find that conditional on the non-competitive performance men are still significantly more confident than women. 20 Interestingly, both men and women are neither over nor under confident relatively to their actual rank (see table  5 ). 21 As stated in the experimental design section, we also measure risk attitudes using the method developed by Holt and Laury (2002) . However, we only report Dohmen et al. measure because many subjects did not have a unique switching point under the lottery measure and, consequently, it is not clear how these observations should be treated. Furthermore, like in Dohmen et al. (2009) and Dohmen and Falk (2010) , we find a strong correlation between subjects' responses to the risk question and the lottery choices for the subjects that have a unique switching point under the lottery measure. n = 188). Hence, according to the Mach-IV test, men have a higher competitive attitude than women.
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To determine how these elements jointly affect the change in performance between stages, and to understand their relative significance we use an augmented version of the linear regression model used in subsection 3.A. In addition to the non-competitive first stage performance and the condition dummies, the set of explanatory variables in Table 6 consists of the confidence index, risk attitude, and competitive attitude. Results in Table 6 show that neither the confidence level nor the risk attitude contribute significantly to the change in performance from the non-competitive to the competitive stage. However, for the competitive attitude the results indicate that a one point higher score of willingness to compete predicts 0.082 more problems solved correctly in the competitive stage, ceteris paribus. This effect is significant but small. 23 An important result shown in Table 6 is that the magnitude and significance of the condition dummies as well as of the intercept is robust to the introduction of the additional explanatory variables. 24 This observation leads to our next result.
Result 4: The treatment effects regarding competitive performance are robust even after
controlling for confidence level, risk attitude and competitive attitude.
C. Is there a stereotype threat shadow?
Considering two groups, one prone and one not prone to stereotype threat, stereotype threat theory essentially predicts that their performance gap in a context where the threat is present should be different than the gap in their performances in a context where the threat is not present. In our study the performance gap between men and women in the no stereotype threat first stage is unfavourable to women in all conditions. Therefore, according to stereotype threat theory we should observe, on the one hand, an increase in the performance gap between men and women in the second stage of the implicit and explicit stereotype against women 22 It is reasonable to interpret the Mach IV test as only measuring a competitive attitude with "elbows". Therefore, strictly speaking we cannot claim a difference between men and women in their absolute competitive attitude based on this test. 23 Although the Mach IV test is measured on a 20-140 point scale, the sample standard deviation of subjects' scores in this test is only 0.928. 24 Since men and women differ significantly in these three individual characteristics, we run an additional regression like the one on Table 6 but that also includes a dummy for sex. In this unreported regression, the dummy for sex is insignificant (p-value = 0.719) while all the rest keeps virtually the same both qualitatively and quantitatively.
conditions and, on the other hand, a decrease in the performance gap between men and women in the second stage of the explicit stereotype threat against men condition. Moreover, the fact that our male and female participants regard their mathematical ability as very important for themselves, 28 reinforces the inconsistency of our results with stereotype 27 The only negatively stereotyped group that do not react positively to the competitive incentives across the three competitive conditions are men in the explicit stereotype against men condition. One could argue that men do not increase their performance under competition in the explicit stereotype against men condition because they experience stereotype threat. However, on top of the evidence to support the stereotype threat hypothesis in this condition only being weak, the fact that women also do not increase their performance under competition indicates that a different effect underlies this observed change in behavior. 28 At the end of the experiment we ask subjects to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with the statement "My math ability is important to me" using a seven-point Likert scale. The average for men and women is 6.1 and 5.8, respectively.
threat theory because this theory suggests that an important mediating factor for an individual to experience stereotype threat is domain identification. That is, an individual has to regard the task's domain as very important for his/her self-esteem (e.g., Aronson et. al, 1999) . We summarize in our next result. 
D. Distracting thoughts versus strategic reasoning: effort provision and error rate
The results support our hypothesis that the key element mediating men's and women's competitive performance and stereotypes is whether the stereotype-based expectations they face support or contradict men's and women's prior belief about the invoked stereotype.
Ground in this mediating element, we suggest two alternative explanations that may accommodate the significant increase of both, men's and women's, performance under competition when the stereotype-based expectations support the prior belief they likely hold and also explain why stereotype-based expectations contradicting the prior belief men and women likely hold impair the competitive performance of both sexes.
One possible explanation is distracting thoughts. The chance to win the competition is higher the more effort a person exerts. Therefore, when assuming the cost of providing effort is small enough and that a person is better off by earning money, it is rational for a person to provide extra effort in the competitive second stage. However, one cannot be sure that extra effort provision implies optimal performance. Distracting thoughts have been shown to affect working memory and attention (e.g., Brewin and Smart, 2005 Men and women in the explicit stereotype against women significantly increase performance under competition as do men and women in the implicit stereotype condition, where no information is provided, because the stereotype-based expectations men and women read in the explicit condition just tells them something they already know. In simple terms, men and women manage to provide extra effort efficiently in these two conditions because there are no distracting thoughts to interfere with their working memory and attention while they perform the task.
An alternative explanation for our results is related to strategic considerations and Bayesian updating of beliefs about one's relative performance. Assuming the cost of the baseline non-competitive effort is negligible but the extra effort that men and women have to provide as a necessary condition to increase their performance under competition is costly, men and women will only provide extra effort if they believe they could win the competition.
Hence, if both men and women in the implicit and explicit stereotype against women conditions are aware of the stereotype that "men are better at maths" but their prior belief is that this differences are small, men and women will provide extra effort in the competitive stage because they believe they could win the competition. However, if men and women update their prior belief that sex differences in math ability are small according to the information they receive in the explicit stereotype against men condition, they will believe the difference in ability to perform the mathematical task at hand is substantial and favours women. In this case, both men and women will provide baseline effort in the competitive second stage because men believe they cannot win the competition and women believe baseline effort is sufficient to win the competition.
Both explanations make predictions consistent with our results. In the following we explore whether we can discriminate the two explanations. To this end we further analyse men's and women's effort provision and accuracy during task performance in the two stages.
We measure accuracy in each stage using the error rate, i.e., the number of wrong answers a subject provides divided by the total number of attempts to solve the problems within the 5 minutes performance. Concerning effort provision, we use as a measure in each stage the total number of attempts to solve the problems within the 5 minutes performance. We also measure the subjects' average time response per correct problem. 29 We consider this latter measure as 29 The average time response per correct problem of a subject is equal to (time in seconds of the last correct answer) / (number of problems solved correctly). We use "time in seconds of the last correct answer" instead of an additional measure of effort provision, which we can use in case the accuracy rate does not change between stages. 30 Men and women significantly increase performance in the competitive second stage compared to the non-competitive first stage in the implicit and explicit stereotype against women conditions. This can be because they provide more effort in the second stage keeping the same accuracy of the first stage, and/or they increase their accuracy in the second stage. 31 Therefore, we first examine men's and women's error rates. These findings are consistent with both alternative explanations. Both predict an increase in men's and women's performance under competition in these two conditions due to higher effort, regardless that extra effort may lead to an increase in accuracy or not. Considering the explicit stereotype against men condition, Table 8 shows that in this condition men's and women's average number of attempts to solve the problems is nearly the same in both stages.
That is, according to this measure their effort provision is not significantly different across stages. Both an explanation based on distracting thoughts or strategic reasoning make predictions about effort provision consistent with this finding. Importantly, however, we also the total performance time (5minutes = 300 seconds) because many subjects make their last correctly attempt before time is over.
observe that in the second stage of this condition women's accuracy is the same whereas men's accuracy is significantly lower in comparison to the first stage. Thus in the case of women it seems that they not only provide the same effort in both stages but also that they show the same accuracy. This behavior is consistent with an explanation based on strategic reasoning rather than on distracting thoughts. For men this is different. Although the number of problems they solve in the second stage does not significantly differ from the first stage, the way they solve the problems seems different. First, in absolute terms men take insignificantly more time to solve the problems correctly in the second stage than in the first stage, 13.44 seconds and 12.6 seconds, respectively. Second, and more importantly, men's error rate is statistically significantly higher in the second stage. Hence, men in the second stage take more time to solve virtually the same number of problems as they did in the first stage because they make more errors. We summarize in our final result. 
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we use a controlled laboratory experiment to test our hypothesis that men's and women's performance under competition when they are competing with each other is negatively affected by stereotypes only if the stereotype-based expectations they face contradict the prior belief men and women hold about the invoked stereotype. Our results support this hypothesis. In the two competitive contexts -the implicit stereotype against women and the explicit stereotype against women conditions -in which we induce stereotypebased expectations that support the stereotype that men and women hold, men and women react positively to the competitive incentives. In the competitive context -the explicit stereotype against men condition -in which we induce explicit stereotype-based expectations that contradict the stereotype that men and women hold, men and women do not react positively to the competitive incentives.
Our results do not support the psychological literature on stereotype threat. According to this literature, we should expect that the performance gap between individuals of a group prone to stereotype threat and the individuals of a group not prone to stereotype threat should be different in a context where the threat exits from a context where the threat is not present. As shown in the results section, we cannot reject in each condition we study that the performance gap between men and women in the first stage, where we do not induce any stereotype threat, is the same as their performance gap in the second stage, where we induce a stereotype threat.
Yet, the psychology literature has been studying stereotype threat in non-competitive contexts.
Hence, a possible reason of why our results are not in accordance with a stereotype threat based explanation is that we evaluate the impact of stereotypes in a competitive context instead. Another possibility of why the adverse effect of stereotype threat over performance is not observed in our study is that, in contrast to a standard stereotype threat study, we use monetary incentives.
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The results support our hypothesis that the key element governing the relation between stereotypes and men's and women's competitive performance is whether the stereotype-based expectations support or contradict the stereotype men and women hold. In line with this mediating element, we advance two alternative explanations to uncover the connection between stereotypes and the competition of the sexes. Both an explanation based on distracting thoughts and its interference with working memory and attention, and an explanation based on strategic considerations and Bayesian updating of beliefs make predictions consistent with our results. Moreover, by analysing men's and women's effort provision and accuracy during task performance, we find that men's behavior is better accommodated by an explanation based on distracting thoughts whereas women's behavior is better accommodated by an explanation based on strategic reasoning.
An alternative interpretation of our results relates to the different priming of men and women in the explicit stereotype conditions. Men and women read the same information in the explicit stereotype conditions. In the explicit stereotype against women condition, the information negatively stereotypes women from a women's perspective whereas it positively stereotypes men from a men's perspective. The opposite occurs in the explicit stereotype against men condition. Therefore, it is conceivable that women and men excel under competition against each other when women have to disconfirm they are worse whereas men have to confirm they are better. Women and men choke under competition against each other when women have to confirm they are better whereas men have to disconfirm they are worse.
This sex difference interpretation is not convincing in our view because it implies that participants in the explicit conditions fear the evaluation of others. This is clearly not the case in our experimental setting.
Finally, our findings contradict previous results in the experimental economics literature suggesting that men are more responsive to competitive incentives than women (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003) . In contrast, we observe that men and women react similarly to competition in terms of performance across three different stereotype threat conditions. A possible reason for this contrast in results is related to our within-subjects design approach. The data supports our view that performance comparisons without controlling for the ability to perform the work task, as is the case in a between-subjects design, could lead to flawed conclusions. 34 Another possible reason is the impact of risk attitudes on performance when comparing performances elicited both under a non-competitive and a competitive incentive scheme. Considering the well documented differences between men's and women's risk attitude (e.g., Croson and Gneezy, 2009) , it is very likely that the influence of this variable is higher in previous studies compared to ours because a less risky incentive scheme is used to elicit non-competitive performance in those studies.
Our paper is part of a research program that is aimed at understanding why women are underrepresented in many high-status jobs and earn lower wages than men. Taking into account the pervasiveness of a stereotype, our results indicate that men and women have a similar reaction to competitive pressure in terms of performance when they have to compete against each other. In other words, different attitudes between the sexes towards competition do not seem to be an explanation for the observed differences between men and women at the workplace in the case that they are already competing. Still, our results have a practical 34 Since repetition does not affect performance in our experiment, we can make the following counterfactual reasoning: if the same subjects that were randomly assigned to the implicit stereotype against women condition (condition 1) had instead been asked to only perform the competitive second stage, their performance would have been virtually the same as the one they actually displayed in the experiment's second stage. Hence, if to evaluate the implicit stereotype against women condition we had instead used a between subjects-design in which the reference of men's average competitive performance was virtually the same as the one we elicited in the second stage of the implicit stereotype against women (28 problems. See Figure 3 ) and the reference of men's average non-competitive performance was the one corresponding to the men's average performance we elicited in the first stage of the explicit stereotype against women condition (30.8 problems. See Figure 3 ), we would have (wrongly) concluded that men do not increase their performance under competition in the implicit stereotype against women condition. Since the data of our experiment was obtained using a random procedure to assign the subjects per each condition, it clearly indicates that performance comparisons based on a between-subjects design could be problematic.
implication regarding policy design to cope with stereotypes at the workplace. A recommendation found in the stereotype threat literature to prevent a negative effect of stereotypes is the "stereotype nullification", i.e., to explicitly provide individuals with information that does not conform to the stereotype (e.g., Smith and White, 2002) . In stark contrast, our results indicate that within a competitive environment no information should be provided at all. If men and women are already competing against each other, they seem to cope well in terms of performance with a stereotype they hold. In this case, providing information contradicting that stereotype seems to harm the performance not only of the negatively but also of the positively stereotyped group. Notes: Performance change is the difference between the competitive second stage performance and the noncompetitive first stage performance; Implicit stereotype against women represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the individuals in the implicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Explicit stereotype against women represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the individuals in the explicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Explicit stereotype against men represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals in the explicit stereotype against men condition, and the value 0 otherwise. The twice random pay condition is the base group for the condition dummies; We run the regression using Noncompetitive performance demean, i.e., (Non-competitive performance -sample mean of Non-competitive performance) in order to make the intercept interpretation meaningful; * statistically significant at 5% level. Notes: Performance change is the difference between the competitive second stage performance and the noncompetitive first stage performance; Women_Implicit ST against women represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the women in the implicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Men_Implicit ST against women represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the men in the implicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Women_Explicit ST against women represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the women in the explicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Men_Explicit ST against women represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the men in the explicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Women_Explicit ST against men represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for women in the explicit stereotype against men condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Men_Explicit ST against men represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for men in the explicit stereotype against men condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Men_Twice random pay represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for men in the twice random pay condition, and the value 0 otherwise. The women in the twice random pay condition is the base group for the condition dummies; * statistically significant at 5% level. Notes: Given 4 other participants that have been randomly chosen with equal probability, subjects are asked to indicate their best estimates in percentage that exactly 0 (rank 1), exactly 1 (rank 2), exactly 2 (rank 3), exactly 3 (rank 4) or exactly 4 (rank 5) of these other participants solved more problems correctly than they did themselves in the 5 minutes non-competitive first stage. The p-value refers to a 2-sided t-test, n = 188. , where i is the outcome that exactly (i-1) other participants solved more problems correctly and p i is the subject's elicited percentage estimate that outcome i is the actual one. Actual rank is computed as follows: using a linear extrapolation, we rescale a subject's non-competitive performance rank in the session he/she attended into a 1-5 scale. Men's average confidence index and average actual rank is 2.75 and 2.60, respectively (p = 0.305, 2-sided t-test). Women's average confidence index and average actual rank is 3.33 and 3.28, respectively (p = 0.728, 2-sided t-test). Notes: Performance change is the difference between the competitive second stage performance and the noncompetitive first stage performance; Implicit stereotype against women represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the individuals in the implicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Explicit stereotype against women represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for the individuals in the explicit stereotype against women condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Explicit stereotype against men represents a dummy that takes the value 1 for individuals in the explicit stereotype against men condition, and the value 0 otherwise; Confidence index measures a subject's relative self-assessment for his/her non-competitive first stage performance on a 1-5 rank scale in which the value 1 is the best and value 5 is the worst; Risk attitude is measured on a 1-10 scale in which the value 0 means 'not at all willing to take risks' and the value 10 means 'very willing to take risks'; Competitive attitude is measured on a 20-140 scale in which higher scores predict more competitive behavior; The twice random pay condition is the base group for the condition dummies. We run the regression using Non-competitive performance, Confidence index, Risk attitude and Competitive attitude demean in order to make the intercept interpretation meaningful; * statistically significant at 5% level. Notes: Error rate is equal to the number of wrong answers a subject provide divided by the total number of attempts to solve the problems within the 5 minutes performance; Number of attempts is equal to the total number of attempts made by a subject to solve the problems within the 5 minutes performance; Average time spent per correct problem for a subject is equal to (time in seconds of the last correct answer) / (number of problems solved correctly). The p-values refer to a paired t-test between the first and the second stage (WSR test conclusions are qualitatively the same). The alternative hypotheses (Ha) are drawn according to the performance results we find in subsection 3.A; ** statistically significant at 5% level; * statistically significant at 10% level.
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